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NOTE
CITY OF OAKLAND V. WELLS FARGO CO.:
EXAMINING THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
STANDARD UNDER THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT
AVA LAU-SILVEIRA*

INTRODUCTION
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 partially deregulated the financial industry under the premise of helping “everyone attain
the American dream of homeownership.”1 In 1999, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) made subprime mortgage loans
readily accessible to those who normally would not qualify.2 People in
the Oakland neighborhood, who “used to find it difficult to obtain mortgages,” were suddenly able to obtain mortgage loans, but with subprime
terms.3 These subprime mortgage loans typically started with low
monthly payments, but would subsequently increase based on changes in
the market interest rates.4 By the fall of 2008, subprime borrowers began
defaulting on their loans at an unprecedented rate.5 As a result, the stock

* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2022, Associate Editor, 202122, Golden Gate University Law Review.
1
Will Kenton, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-services-act-of-1999.asp; Paul Kosakowski, The
Fall of the Market in the Fall of 2008, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 9, 2021).
2
Kosakowski, supra note 2.
3
Barbara Grady, East Oakland Shows Signs of Being Epicenter for Foreclosure Crisis, E.
BAY TIMES (June 26, 2008), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2008/06/26/east-oakland-shows-signsof-being-epicenter-of-foreclosure-crisis/.
4
Kosakowski, supra note 2; Grady, supra note 4.
5
Kosakowski, supra note 2.
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market and housing market crashed, the banks collapsed, and a global
recession ensued.6
During the 2008 mortgage crisis, Oakland residents counted more
than 150 properties in foreclosure across a 1.5-mile swath.7 Many residents lost their homes, gang graffiti adorned the buildings, and the
abandoned homes became a breeding ground for drug dealers.8 Across
the state, a similar scenario plagued the City of Cleveland.9 Residents
abandoned entire city blocks as their homes got repossessed.10 Widespread foreclosures led to crimes like arson and other nuisances that the
city expended resources to ameliorate, costing the city hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.11 Like many cities and counties across the
United States, the City of Cleveland blamed the financial crisis on banks
for knowingly “flooding the local housing market with subprime mortgage loans to those who could never repay.”12 The City of Cleveland
also alleged that the banks violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA” or the
“Act”) for unfairly targeting African Americans with high-interest, subprime mortgage loans.13
In April 1968, during a time of civil unrest and injustice, Congress
enacted the FHA to eliminate housing segregation and overt discrimination in the sale, renting, and financing of housing.14 The Act made it
unlawful for any person or business engaged in real estate-related transactions to discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.15 Specifically, it prohibited banks and
any loan association or corporation from fixing the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms and conditions of a commercial real estate loan
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin.16
Following the 2008 housing market crash and subsequent recession,
many local governments across the country suffered economic harm and
6

Kosakowski, supra note 2.
Grady, supra note 4.
8
Grady, supra note 4.
9
Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders Over Subprime Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
12, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/us/12cleveland.html?searchResultPosition=1.
10
Maag, supra note 10.
11
Maag, supra note 10.
12
Maag, supra note 10 (alteration in original).
13
Maag, supra note 10.
14
Michela Zonta, Racial Disparities in Home Appreciation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July
15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/15/
469838/racial-disparities-home-appreciation/.
15
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
16
See id. § 3605.
7
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turned to the FHA for redress.17 Within the past decade, many cities and
counties filed suit against major banks and lenders under the Act.18
These cities and counties claimed injuries of reduced tax revenue and
increased municipal spending, caused by the lenders’ decades-long practices of predatory lending.19 Litigants included California, Illinois, Georgia, Ohio, Florida, and major cities such as Los Angeles, Miami,
Memphis, and Baltimore.20
In the suits, the plaintiffs alleged that banks such as Wells Fargo,
Bank of America, and Citigroup exacerbated the housing crisis by providing African American and Latinx borrowers with less favorable loan
terms than similarly situated white borrowers.21 The loan terms allegedly
caused widespread foreclosures and blight22 in minority neighborhoods,
increasing municipal spending and diminishing the city and county’s
property tax revenues.23 However, the courts largely dismissed or resolved the lawsuits on summary judgment24 in favor of the banks, on
statute of limitation grounds, lack of standing, or for failure to plausibly
allege proximate cause for the injuries suffered.25
On appeal, the only suits that made any significant breakthrough
were Bank of America v. City of Miami (“Miami I”), and more recently,
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo (“City of Oakland I”).26 In Miami I, the
City of Miami brought suit against Bank of America in 2013, alleging
the bank steered minority borrowers toward loans with predatory terms,
causing unnecessary foreclosures and blight conditions that reduced the
city’s tax revenue and increased the city’s spending.27 However, the district court dismissed the city’s claims on three grounds: (1) lack of statu17
Nicholas Agnello, Cities Are Looking to Fair Housing Act to Fight Redlining, LAW360
(Nov. 5, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/723243/cities-are-looking-to-fair-housing-act-to-fight-redlining.
18
Agnello, supra note 18.
19
Agnello, supra note 18.
20
Agnello, supra note 18.
21
Agnello, supra note 18.
22
See City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Bank of
America caused minority-owned properties throughout Miami to fall into unnecessary or premature
foreclosure, depriving the City of tax revenue and forcing it to spend more on municipal services
(such as police, firefighters, trash and debris removal, etc.) to combat the resulting blight.”).
23
Agnello, supra note 18.
24
Summary judgment is “a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another
party without a full trial.” Summary Judgment, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
summary_judgment (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
25
Agnello, supra note 18.
26
See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); City of Oakland v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.
2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
27
City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1267.
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tory standing;28 (2) lack of proximate cause; and (3) statute of
limitations.29
Two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on appeal.30 The Eleventh Circuit held that the city had statutory standing to sue and that the city adequately alleged proximate cause.31 The court also found that the city may
overcome the statute of limitations if it could show the bank’s “discriminatory practices continued into the statutory period.”32 The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to grant leave to
amend and allow the city to proceed with its FHA claims.33
Following this decision, the bank appealed and the Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari, making Miami the first city to
reach the Supreme Court in a predatory lending dispute.34 The Supreme
Court agreed that the city’s property tax and municipal spending injuries
fell within the FHA’s zone of interest.35 However, the Court found that a
plaintiff showing its injuries were foreseeable was not sufficient to establish proximate cause under the FHA.36 Rather than ordering a dismissal,
the Court remanded with instructions to “define the contours of proximate cause under the FHA” without determining “which side of the line
the City’s financial injuries fall.”37 This left the lower courts to ultimately decide the “precise boundaries of proximate cause under the
FHA.”38

28

“Statutory standing . . . is a question of whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Constitutional And Statutory (fka “Prudential”) Standing, PAT. DEFS., https://patentdefenses.klarquist.com/constitutional-standing/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2021).
29
City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1266.
30
Id. at 1289.
31
Id. at 1266.
32
Id. at 1283-84.
33
Agnello, supra note 18.
34
See Trevor C. Hoffberger, Comment, Still Standing, Barely: Bank of America Corp. v. City
of Miami and the Impact on Fair Lending Litigation, 78 MD. L. REV. 967 (2019).
35
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017). See Michael P. Healy,
The Claims and Limits of Justice Scalia’s Textualism: Lessons from his Statutory Standing Decisions, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2861, 2862 (2019) (The zone-of-interests test determines whether a
party has statutory standing and “necessitated a showing that the claimed illegality proximately
caused the injury to the person bringing the claim.”).
36
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
37
Id. at 1301, 1306.
38
City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting City
of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015)).
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Around the same time the Supreme Court ruled in Miami I,39 the
City of Oakland (“Oakland”) initiated a similar predatory lending suit
against Wells Fargo alleging virtually the same violations under the
FHA.40 In City of Oakland I, Oakland alleged that Wells Fargo intentionally steered African-American and Latinx borrowers into high-cost, subprime loans.41 Oakland further alleged that Wells Fargo used race as a
factor in deciding what loans to offer minority borrowers.42 According to
Oakland, this resulted in high rates of foreclosures and both economic
and non-economic injuries to the city.43 In response, Wells Fargo filed a
motion to dismiss Oakland’s claims.44 The district court granted in part
and denied in part Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss.45
Wells Fargo appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit denied Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Oakland’s alleged property tax injuries and request for injunctive and declaratory relief.46 However, the court granted the bank’s motion to dismiss the
allegations related to increased municipal spending.47 A year later, the
Ninth Circuit (“en banc court”) vacated its prior decision and granted a
rehearing en banc.48 The en banc court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Oakland’s increased municipal expenditures claim.49 The court
also reversed the district court’s denial of Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Oakland’s lost property tax revenue and injunctive and declaratory
relief claims.50 Essentially, the en banc court dismissed Oakland’s entire
damages claims.51
39

Miami I refers to Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017); Miami II
refers to City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2019), vacated as moot, 140
S. Ct. 1259 (2020).
40
See City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.
2020), vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
14 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021) (The amended complaint “allege that WF offered mortgage loans to
Oakland residents on a race-discriminatory basis, constituting both intentional and disparate-impact
discrimination. This discrimination allegedly caused high rates of foreclosure which heavily impacted minority borrowers and harmed Oakland in various ways.”).
41
Id. at *4.
42
Id.
43
Id. at *8.
44
Id. at *3 (“WF brings this motion to dismiss primarily challenging Oakland’s ability to
demonstrate proximate cause.”).
45
Id.
46
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1137 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g
granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th
Cir. 2021).
47
Id.
48
See City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 14 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
49
Id. at 1042.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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This Note argues, as the en banc court affirmed, that the Ninth Circuit erred in denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Oakland’s reduced
property tax claim.52 The en banc court held that Oakland did not satisfy
proximate cause for its reduced tax revenue claim because Oakland’s
harm ran far beyond the first step.53 Similarly, this Note argues that Oakland failed to satisfy the FHA’s proximate cause requirement because
Oakland failed to establish a direct connection between its asserted injuries and Wells Fargo’s alleged predatory lending practices.54 While this
Note reached the same conclusion as the en banc court, this Note applied
a different interpretation of the Holmes three-factor feasibility test55 in
reaching that decision.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of City of Oakland I 56 and
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the three-factor feasibility test.57 Part II
traces the proximate cause doctrine under common law and the doctrine’s recent application in statutory claims. Using relevant cases preceding City of Oakland I, this Note unpacks the various standards of
proximate cause applied in similar statutory causes of action. Part III
confronts the flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s City of Oakland I holding,
particularly with respect to the ruling that Oakland’s reduced property
tax claim satisfied the proximate cause requirement under the FHA. It
also describes the basis for the en banc court’s decision and how the
court’s reasoning differs from this Note.
I. OVERVIEW OF CITY OF OAKLAND V. WELLS FARGO CO.
On September 21, 2015, Oakland filed a lawsuit against Wells
Fargo, alleging injuries caused by Wells Fargo’s predatory loan practices.58 Specifically, Oakland claimed injury in three ways.59 First, Wells
52

Id. See City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1132.
City of Oakland, 14 F.4th at 1035-36.
54
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1132. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct.
1296, 1306 (2017) (“[P]roximate cause under the FHA requires ‘some direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’ ”) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
55
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 (The three-factor feasibility test was established in Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corporation).
56
City of Oakland I refers to City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.
2020), vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
14 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021); City of Oakland II refers to City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 14
F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
57
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128-30.
58
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100915,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2020),
vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14
F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
53
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Fargo’s unlawful lending practices allegedly led African American and
Latinx homebuyers to default on their home loans more often than white
borrowers.60 Oakland argued this affected the property values of homes
and led to a disproportionate number of foreclosures in minority neighborhoods.61 As a result, Oakland suffered economic harm because it collected lower property tax revenues.62 Second, Oakland claimed that
property foreclosures increased criminal activity, arson, vagrancy, and
other threats to the public’s health and safety, which Oakland expended
resources to ameliorate.63 Third, Wells Fargo’s unlawful conduct allegedly caused a large number of minorities to lose their homes, impairing
Oakland’s goals of promoting a racially integrated community and ending racial disparities within the city.64 Wells Fargo responded with a motion to dismiss Oakland’s claims, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”), rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim.65 The
district court denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss,
permitting Oakland to proceed with both its request for declaratory or
injunctive relief and reduced property tax claim.66 However, the district
court dismissed Oakland’s claim related to increased municipal spending.67 The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted interlocutory appeal.68
Reviewing the case de novo,69 the Ninth Circuit started by examining the “contours of proximate cause under the FHA” and how that standard applied to Oakland’s proclaimed injuries.70 To determine the
contours of proximate cause, the court evaluated the nature of the statutory cause of action by reviewing the FHA’s text and legislative history.71 The Ninth Circuit’s inquiry concerned whether Congress passed
the FHA in 1968 to provide redress for aggregate, city-wide injuries.72
The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress intended the statute to allow
59

Id.
Id. at *5-6.
61
Id. at *3.
62
Id. at *7.
63
Id.
64
Id. at *7-8.
65
Id. at *3.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g
granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th
Cir. 2021); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1982) (An interlocutory
appeal is “a mechanism by which litigants can bring an immediate appeal of a non-final order upon
the consent of both the district court and the court of appeals.”).
69
Collier & Wallis, Ltd. v. Astor, 9 Cal.2d 202, 205 (1937) (“A hearing de novo literally
means a new hearing, or a hearing the second time.”).
70
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d at 1124.
71
Id.
72
Id.
60
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suits by a wide range of plaintiffs, including victims who were not the
immediate victims of direct discrimination under the FHA.73 The Ninth
Circuit also found that Congress wanted to help reverse segregation, suburban flight, and urban decay caused by racially discriminatory housing
practices in cities.74 Most significantly, Senator Mondale specifically
“referenced cities’ ‘declining tax base’ as one of the large-scale injuries
that the FHA was designed to mitigate.”75 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
found that Congress intended the FHA to reach “neighborhood-wide and
city-wide injuries” including those brought by Oakland.76
After the Ninth Circuit established that Oakland’s city-wide financial injury claims were within the zone of interests protected by the FHA,
the Ninth Circuit considered what is administratively feasible by applying the three-factor feasibility test outlined in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation.77 The purpose of this analysis is to
determine if “a plaintiff’s alleged injuries are ‘too remote’ to satisfy the
proximate-cause requirement of the statute . . . .”78 The first Holmes
factor asks if it would be possible to determine the portion of Oakland’s
damages that are attributable to Wells Fargo’s unlawful conduct.79 According to Oakland, a regression analysis would be used to “quantify the
loss” attributable to Wells Fargo’s discriminatory lending.80 Oakland explained in considerable length how the regression analysis could be used
to quantify the precise loss attributable to Wells Fargo.”81 The Ninth
Circuit found the harm plausible82 on its face because the analysis used
to measure damages was “sophisticated, reliable, and scientifically rigorous” and neither speculative nor conclusory.83 Relying on Oakland’s ex73

Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
75
Id. (“Declining tax base, poor sanitation, loss of jobs, inadequate educational opportunity,
and urban squalor will persist as long as discrimination forces millions to live in the rotting cores of
central cities.”) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3421, 2274 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76
Id. at 1126-27.
77
Id. at 1127-28; Id. at 1128 (the administratively feasible analysis asks whether an alleged
harm is too remote from the defendant’s conduct to satisfy proximate cause).
78
Id. at 1128 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
133 (2014)).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—’that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ ”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 570, 556 (2007)).
83
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128.
74
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planation as to how it would calculate precisely which lost property-tax
revenues were attributable to Wells Fargo, the court found that Oakland
satisfied the first Holmes factor.84
The second Holmes factor inquires whether it would be possible to
apportion damages among each plaintiff to avoid double recovery arising
from the same harm.85 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the risk of duplicative recovery did not exist because individual borrowers cannot recover Oakland’s reduced property-tax revenues or increased municipal
spending.86 Moreover, the minority borrowers’ injuries that resulted from
Wells Fargo’s alleged predatory lending practices were completely separate from Oakland’s damages.87 Therefore, there was no risk of duplicative recovery.88
Finally, the third Holmes factor asks if allowing recovery of indirect
injuries would deter Wells Fargo’s unlawful conduct more effectively
because directly injured victims cannot be relied on to sue.89 Courts primarily applied the third factor to antitrust cases because suits brought by
indirectly harmed plaintiffs were typically less effective in deterring
wrongdoers.90 The Ninth Circuit explained that Oakland could better deter Wells Fargo’s wrongdoing “because it can sue to remedy the Bank’s
systematic misconduct across thousands of home loans,” whereas individual borrowers can only raise individual allegations.91 The Ninth Circuit held that all three factors supported the finding that Oakland’s
injuries were administratively feasible and convenient under the FHA.92
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the two questions certified for interlocutory appeal: (1) whether Oakland’s reduced property tax revenue and
increased municipal spending charges satisfied the FHA’s proximatecause requirement; and (2) whether the FHA’s proximate cause requirement applied to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.93 The Ninth
Circuit held that Oakland’s reduced property-tax revenue claim met the
proximate cause standard because Oakland could isolate the lost property
value attributable to Wells Fargo, as opposed to other potential causes.94
As to Oakland’s increased municipal spending claim, the court held that
it could not survive a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) because
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
85

at 1128-29.
at 1129.

at
at
at
at

1129-30.
1128.
1121.
1132, 1135.
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Oakland merely concluded that Wells Fargo’s loans caused it to expend
additional resources.95 As to Oakland’s last claim, the Ninth Circuit held
that the proximate cause requirement applied to claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief because plaintiffs must establish proximate cause “to
receive any form of relief.”96 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether Wells Fargo’s predatory
lending practices proximately caused Oakland’s injuries.97
II. THE PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE UNDER COMMON LAW
At common law, causation requires both cause-in-fact and proximate
cause.98 Cause-in-fact, or factual cause, is found when the injuries would
not have occurred, but-for the defendant’s conduct.99 By contrast, proximate cause focuses on the degree of connection between the harm and
the wrongful conduct.100 It is concerned with whether the defendant’s
conduct is the “actual” cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.101 However, even
if there is “actual” cause, courts will deny recovery if the causal relationship is too attenuated or remote.102
The concept of proximate cause can be traced back to Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Company, a seminal torts case where the New
York Court of Appeals103 held that defendant, Long Island Railroad, was
not liable for injuries sustained by an innocent bystander.104 Writing for
the majority, Judge Cardozo framed the issue as whether the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.”105 Judge Cardozo reasoned that the
defendant was only liable to those within the zone of danger, meaning
those who the defendant could have reasonably foreseen would be injured.106 Because the guard could not have reasonably foreseen that the
95

Id. at 1136.
Id.
97
Id. at 1137.
98
Nicole Summers, Setting the Standard for Proximate Cause in the Wake of Bank of
America Corp. v. City of Miami, 97 N.C.L. REV. 529, 542 (2019).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 542-43.
101
See John L. Diamond, Lawrence C. Levine & Anita Bernstein, Understanding Torts 179
(6th ed. 2018).
102
Id.
103
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (At the time, the court was
called Court of Appeals of New York).
104
See id. at 101.
105
Thomas A. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV 46, 48 (1938),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217208392.pdf.
106
Summers, supra note 99, at 543.
96
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man’s package contained explosives and that the explosion would injure
the plaintiff who was standing far away, the plaintiff could not hold the
defendant liable for her injuries.107 Judge Cardozo also declined to extend negligence liability to the defendant because there was no duty of
care owed to the plaintiff.108
By contrast, Judge Andrews characterized the issue as one of proximate cause and not of negligence.109 This set the stage for the presentday debate over which standards of proximate cause should apply.110
Judge Andrews, in his dissent, criticized the fact that because of public
policy, “the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point.”111 He took the view that “negligent conduct entailed liability for all harmful consequences of which it was the proximate cause”
regardless of foreseeability.112 In his view, a person owes “the world at
large the duty not to engage in conduct” that creates an unforeseeable
risk of harm to others.113 If harm results from such conduct, that individual should be liable for all injuries so long as he proximately caused the
injuries.114
In Judge Cardozo’s view, proximate cause is “rooted in the same
principles as the standard of care for negligence liability,” which extends
liability if the alleged injurious conduct poses a foreseeable risk of harm
to others.115 Conversely, Judge Andrews’s view of proximate cause demands an inquiry into whether the injury was too remote.116 Under this
standard, the court must ask “whether there was a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect.”117 Other inquiries used to determine
proximate cause include: whether the conduct was a substantial factor in
causing the harm; whether there was a direct connection between the
harm and the conduct, without too many intervening factors; and whether
the cause and effect were too attenuated.118

107

Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
Cowan, supra note 106, at 48.
109
Summers, supra note 99, at 543.
110
Id. at 544.
111
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
112
Cowan, supra note 106, at 48.
113
Id. at 50.
114
Id.
115
Summers, supra note 99, at 544.
116
Cowan, supra note 106, at 47.
117
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
118
Id.
108
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B. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN STATUTORY CLAIMS
No statutory text has ever expressly necessitated a plaintiff bringing
a statutory claim to show that the defendant proximately caused its injuries.119 There is no clear proximate cause standard for any one statutory
claim, and “no clear precedent which dictates how to determine . . . proximate cause in a given statutory context.”120 Yet, the Supreme Court has
incorporated the proximate cause requirement into statutory claims since
1983.121 In 2014, the Supreme Court declared that all statutory causes of
action must establish proximate cause to recover on a damages claim.122
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
Justice Scalia opined that for centuries, “a statutory cause of action is
limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations
of the statute.”123 Under well-established common law principles, courts
must attribute all cases of loss to proximate cause.124 This principle reflects the notion that not every conceivable harm can be traced to the
alleged wrongdoing.125 Thus, the courts have required federal causes of
action under different contexts to establish proximate causation.126 According to Justice Scalia, the proximate cause inquiry requires asking
“whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”127 Generally, a plaintiff is barred from recovery if the alleged harm is too remote from the defendant’s conduct.128 If
a plaintiff’s harm is derivative of a third party’s injuries, courts have
generally deemed the harm too remote.129
1. The Direct-Relation Standard
The directness standard applied to establish proximate cause in FHA
claims is narrower than the common law foreseeability standard.130 Due
to the broad reach of plaintiffs under the foreseeability standard, courts
have often declined to apply the foreseeability standard because of the
119

Healy, supra note 36, at 2862.
Summers, supra note 99, at 548 (alteration in original).
121
Id. at 547.
122
Id. at 540-41.
123
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 133.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (Allowing plaintiffs to recover for any foreseeable injury resulting from an FHA violation “would risk ‘massive and
complex damages litigation.’ ”) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992)).
120

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol52/iss1/3

12

LAU-SILVEIRA: CITY OF OAKLAND V. WELLS FARGO CO.: EXAMINING THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

2022]

City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Co.

61

need to limit liability.131 Rather, courts have applied the directness standard, which has been one of the central elements required to establish
proximate cause for several reasons.132 First, the more indirect the injury,
the more difficult it is to ascertain damages attributable to the defendant.133 Second, recognizing indirect injuries would “force courts to
adopt complicated rules” to divide damages among different plaintiffs at
multiple levels.134 Third, directly injured victims can sue without the
problems that accompany suits by plaintiffs who were more remotely
injured.135 Fourth, allowing those indirectly injured to sue would “open
the door to ‘massive and complex damages litigation . . . .’”136
In Holmes, the Supreme Court applied the directness standard to establish proximate cause and found that the defendants were not responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.137 The plaintiff, a securities protection
company, alleged that the defendants’ stock-manipulation scheme caused
multiple stocks to plummet.138 The broker dealers, who invested a substantial amount in the stocks, suffered significant financial losses.139 As a
result, the plaintiff, a corporation with a duty to reimburse the registered
broker-dealers’ customers, had to advance $13 million to reimburse the
customers.140 The Court found that the link between the harm and the
defendant’s alleged conduct was too remote to establish proximate cause,
reasoning that the plaintiff suffered injuries “only insofar as the stock
manipulation first injured the broker-dealers . . . .”141 Based on the general tendency “not to go beyond the first step,” the Court in Holmes
concluded that the plaintiff’s claim, as a secondary victim who suffered
indirect injuries, did not satisfy the proximate cause standard.142

131
Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981). See Holmes, 503
U.S. at 274 (“[A]llowing suits by those injured only indirectly would open the door to massive and
complex damages litigation . . . .”).
132
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 269-70.
136
Id. at 274 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 545 (1983)).
137
Id. at 268-69.
138
Id. at 262.
139
Id. at 263.
140
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 465 (2006).
141
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271.
142
Id. at 271-74 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Redefining the Directness Standard
In Lexmark, the Supreme Court redefined the directness standard by
holding that proximate cause can be satisfied even if there is a multi-step
causal chain connecting the alleged injury to the violation.143 The plaintiff, a replacement part maker company, alleged that Lexmark misled its
users to believe that it was illegal to use the plaintiff’s products to refurbish and sell Lexmark’s Prebate Program ink cartridges.144 Lexmark’s
misrepresentations allegedly diverted the plaintiff’s sales and hurt its
business reputation, which resulted in business losses.145
The Court held that the plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the proximate
cause requirement because there was no discontinuity between the plaintiff’s injury and Lexmark’s conduct.146 The plaintiff argued that if
remanufacturers withheld 10,000 refurbished cartridges due to
Lexmark’s false advertisement, it would follow that the plaintiff sold
$10,000 fewer microchips.147 The plaintiff was able to link its damages
to Lexmark’s false advertisement because there was “a 1:1 relationship”
between the number of microchips and refurbished cartridges sold.148
This allowed the plaintiff to calculate damages attributable to Lexmark
without speculation and inquiries into whether other intervening factors
caused its business losses.149 Thus, this satisfied the directness element
required to establish proximate cause.150
3. A Plaintiff’s Damages Must Not be Too Remote or Speculative
An important question courts consider when determining proximate
cause is whether the plaintiff’s asserted damages could be attributed to
the defendant’s wrongful conduct.151 In Oregon Laborers-Employers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc. (“Oregon Laborers”), the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was too
remote to support its claims.152 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
defrauded the public by concealing the risks of smoking and by sup143

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 139-40 (2014).
Id. at 122-23.
145
Id. at 123.
146
Id. at 140.
147
Id. at 139-40.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 140.
151
Oregon Laborers-Emps. Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957,
964 (9th Cir 1999).
152
Id.
144
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pressing product information.153 The plaintiffs further alleged this led to
higher medical costs because it prevented them from taking measures to
reduce smoking among their participants.154
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit’s position in
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,155
opining that it would be difficult to ascertain the plaintiffs’ damages because the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate: (1) which of the participants would have quit smoking if provided safer smoking information;
(2) how many participants would have smoked less; (3) the health conditions of the participants if they had taken action; and (4) how much
plaintiffs would have saved.156 The plaintiffs argued “that they can
demonstrate all of this through aggregation and statistical modeling
. . . .”157 However, the Ninth Circuit was unconvinced and did not believe that aggregation and statistical modeling would be sufficient to
overcome “the AGC factor”158 focusing on whether the claim was too
speculative.159
4. A Damages Claim Requiring Courts to Engage in Intricate,
Uncertain Inquiries is Generally Barred from Recovery
Another relevant factor to consider in the proximate cause analysis
is the question of whether maintaining a plaintiff’s claims would force
the court to engage in “intricate, uncertain inquiries.”160 In Canyon
County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., Canyon County (“County”) brought an
action against the defendants under the civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations statute (“RICO”), alleging that the defendants illegally employed and harbored undocumented immigrant workers.161 As a
153

Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
155
Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 171 F.3d 912, 918
(3d Cir 1999) (a suit brought by union health and welfare funds against tobacco companies that
essentially alleged the same claims as in Oregon Laborers).
156
Oregon Laborers-Emps. Health, 185 F.3d at 964-65 (quoting Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at
929).
157
Id. at 965.
158
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545
(1983) (AGC factors: “the nature of the injury, the tenuous and speculative character of the relationship between the alleged violation and the alleged injury, the potential for duplicative recovery or
complex apportionment of damages, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged conspiracy . . . .”) (alteration in original).
159
Oregon Laborers-Emps. Health, 185 F.3d at 964-65 (quoting Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at
929).
160
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006).
161
Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2008). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
154
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result, the County allegedly expended millions in health care and law
enforcement services on the illegal immigrants that the defendants
employed.162
The court applied the rationales described in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation163 and found too many alternative causes for the
County’s alleged harm to establish proximate cause, such as: demographic changes; changes in public health practices; insurance coverage,
and more.164 The Ninth Circuit found that the County’s claim would
force the court to evaluate the extent to which the defendants’ hiring
practices had created increased expenditures for the County, “an ‘intricate, uncertain’ inquiry of the type that the Anza Court warned
against.”165 Precisely, the Anza Court warned against allowing a plaintiff
to maintain its claim if it would burden the courts with calculating complex damages attributable to the defendant’s conduct.166 According to
Anza, the proximate cause requirement is meant to prevent suits requiring “intricate, uncertain inquiries” from overrunning the court.167
C. PROXIMATE CAUSE UNDER THE FHA
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark,168 the district
court held for the first time that a city claiming an FHA violation must
demonstrate proximate cause for its injuries.169 Both the district court
and Eleventh Circuit applied the foreseeability test for proximate cause,
which asks whether the bank could have reasonably foreseen the city’s
injuries.170 However, the Supreme Court rejected the foreseeability stanof this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains . . . .”).
162
Canyon County, 519 F.3d at 971-72.
163
Anza, 547 U.S. at 458-59 (The rationales were: “difficulty that can arise when a court
attempts to ascertain the damages . . . the attenuated connection between plaintiff’s injury and defendant’s injurious conduct . . . risk of duplicative recoveries, . . . whether the immediate victims of an
alleged . . . violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims.”) (alteration in original).
164
Canyon County, 519 F.3d at 983.
165
Id. (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 460.)
166
See Anza, 547 U.S. at 459.
167
Id. at 460.
168
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1307 (2017) (the Court made clear
in Lexmark that proximate cause is applied “to all statutorily created causes of action . . . unless it is
expressly negated.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
169
Summers, supra note 99, at 539-40.
170
See City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015); Summers, supra note 99, at 540-41.
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dard, reasoning that it “does not ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.”171
1. Proximate Cause Under the FHA Requires Some Direct Relation
Between the Claimed Injury and Alleged Illegality
Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Breyer held that proximate
cause requires “some direct relation” between the alleged injurious conduct and asserted injury.172 The Supreme Court explained that the housing market is closely connected with “economic and social life.”173
Therefore, an FHA violation may cause “‘ripples of harm’ . . . far beyond the defendant’s conduct.”174 However, Congress did not intend the
FHA to “provide a remedy wherever those ripples travel.”175 Justice
Breyer opined that allowing plaintiffs to recover for any foreseeable injury resulting from an FHA violation “would risk ‘massive and complex
damages litigation.’”176
2. Justice Thomas Found the City’s Injuries Too Remote to Satisfy
Proximate Cause Under the FHA
Although Justice Thomas, in his Miami I dissent, disagreed with the
majority’s zones-of-interests holding, he agreed with the Court’s holding
regarding proximate cause.177 Justice Thomas agreed that the FHA statute required “some direct relation” between the bank’s alleged misconduct and the city’s asserted injuries to satisfy proximate cause.178 He also
concurred that foreseeability was not enough to establish proximate
cause.179 Whereas the majority declined to decide the critical question of
whether the city’s asserted injuries fell within the “contours of proximate
cause under the FHA,” Justice Thomas concluded that the city’s injuries
were “too remote to satisfy the FHA’s proximate-cause requirement.”180
Justice Thomas asserted that neither the city “nor any similarly situated plaintiff” could satisfy the “rigorous standard for proximate cause”
171

Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 534 (1983)).
175
Id.
176
Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992)).
177
Id. at 1311 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at
268) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180
Id. at 1307 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172
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because the link between the asserted injuries and alleged FHA violation
was too attenuated.181 Justice Thomas illustrated the multi-step causal
chain connecting the city’s injuries to the defendant’s alleged FHA violation as follows: the bank’s discriminatory lending practices led “borrowers from predominantly minority neighborhoods” to default, which led to
foreclosures, which led to vacant homes, which led to “decreased property values for surrounding homes,” which led to “reduced property taxes
and urban blight.”182 Based on this attenuated causal chain, Justice
Thomas found the city’s injuries too far removed from the bank’s alleged
conduct.183
Furthermore, Justice Thomas contended that the city’s injuries, being “one step further removed” from the neighboring homeowners’ injuries, cannot “sufficiently plead proximate cause” because the
neighboring homeowners, whose home values declined, cannot sue under
the FHA to recover damages as an indirect victim.184 Although the majority remanded for the lower court to decide the proximate cause issue,
Justice Thomas felt confident that it would not take long for the circuit
court to discover that other, independent events may well have caused
the city’s injuries.185
III. ANALYSIS
A. APPLYING THE HOLMES THREE-FACTOR TEST WEIGHED IN FAVOR
OF FINDING OAKLAND’S PROPERTY TAX REVENUE CLAIM
NOT ADMINISTRATIVELY FEASIBLE AND CONVENIENT
Precedent makes clear that a direct causal connection is required to
establish proximate cause in a statutory damages action.186 A direct connection means the link between the asserted injury and violative conduct
cannot be “‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t].’”187 In a
181

Id. at 1311 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original).
183
Id. at 1311-12 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184
Id. at 1312 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185
Id. at 1311 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186
See generally Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (“ ‘[P]roximate
cause’ requires some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”);
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006) (“When a court evaluates a RICO claim
for proximate causation, the central question . . . is whether the alleged violation led directly to the
plaintiff’s injuries.”); Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (“[P]roximate cause under the FHA
requires ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
187
Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at
274).
182
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damages case, the tendency is “not to go beyond the first step.”188 “What
falls within that first step depends in part on the ‘nature of the statutory
cause of action,’ and an assessment ‘of what is administratively possible
and convenient.’”189
Determining the nature of the statutory cause of action “requires a
close review of the FHA’s text and legislative history” whereas considering “‘what is administratively possible and convenient’” requires asking
whether the plaintiff’s injuries are too remote to satisfy proximate
cause.190 In an administrative feasibility analysis, the court must weigh
the following factors outlined in Holmes: (1) the level of difficulty in
ascertaining damages attributable to the defendant; (2) the need to “adopt
complicated rules” to apportion damages among different plaintiffs to
avoid risk of multiple recoveries; and (3) whether the immediate victim
could be counted on to sue.191
1. Factor One: The Difficulty in Ascertaining Damages
It is undisputed that Wells Fargo issued discriminatory loans to Oakland residents and that Wells Fargo’s predatory lending practices did not
directly cause Oakland’s reduced property tax injuries.192 Rather, Oakland suffered injuries through a five-step causal chain.193 That is, Wells
Fargo allegedly issued predatory loans to minority Oakland residents in
violation of the FHA; the residents defaulted on the loans; Wells Fargo
foreclosed on the homes; this led property values to drop; and Oakland’s
tax revenues diminished.194 To satisfy proximate cause, Oakland must
establish there was no discontinuity, or intervening factors, which broke
the chain connecting Wells Fargo’s misconduct to its indirect tax revenue
injuries.195
188

Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1299 (quoting Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 10).
Id. at 1306 (first quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
118, 133 (2014); then quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268)).
190
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th
1030 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (2017)).
191
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269; City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128.
192
See City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1119 (Oakland alleged Wells Fargo issued predatory
loans to its Black and Latinx residents. Those loans caused foreclosures, which reduced property
values. Consequently, Oakland collected less property tax revenues.)
193
Cf. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1307 (“[P]etitioners’ allegedly discriminatory mortgage-lending practices led to defaulted loans, which led to foreclosures, which led to vacant houses,
which led to decreased property values, which led to reduced property taxes . . . .”) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194
See City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1119.
195
Cf. id. at 1132 (“[A]n intervening step does not necessarily break the causal chain if there
is continuity between the . . . injuries and . . . misconduct.”).
189
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In Lexmark, the plaintiff was able to link its damages to the defendant’s false advertisement because if remanufacturers withheld 10,000
refurbished cartridges due to Lexmark’s false advertisement, it would
follow that the plaintiff sold $10,000 fewer microchips.196 This meant
that the Court did not have to speculate or engage in complex inquiries to
determine whether other intervening factors caused the plaintiff’s business losses.197 This is distinguished from City of Oakland I, because if
there were 100,000 foreclosures due to Wells Fargo’s predatory lending
practices, it would not necessarily follow that those 100,000 foreclosures
caused surrounding property values to decrease.198 For instance, crime
increase in the neighborhood, leading to robberies and mindless vandalism, could negatively affect home values and break the causal chain between Oakland’s tax revenue losses and Wells Fargo’s unfair lending
practices.199
In Anza, the Court denied the plaintiff’s damages claim because
businesses lose customers for many reasons, and it would require a complex assessment to establish what portion of lost sales were the product
of the defendant’s misconduct.200 If allowed to proceed, the district court
would need to calculate the portion of the price drop attributable to the
alleged illegal conduct, and then “calculate the portion of . . . lost sales
attributable to the relevant part of the price drop.”201 Similarly, in City of
Oakland I, property values fluctuate for many reasons, and it would be
difficult to determine which properties’ values decreased due to Wells
Fargo’s predatory loans, as opposed to other factors.202 Assuming Oakland’s Hedonic regression analysis203 could “precisely calculate the exact
196

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 139-40 (2014).
See id.
198
See DIAMOND, supra note 102, at 171 (proximate cause extends liability if the alleged
conduct materially contributed to the injury asserted; however, a defendant is not the direct cause of
harm if any new or intervening force causes the injury); Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 134 N.M. 43,
191-92 (2003) (“An independent intervening cause is ‘a cause which interrupts the natural sequence
of events, turns aside their cause, prevents the natural and probable results of the original act or
omission, and produces a different result, that could have been reasonably foreseen.’ ”) (quoting
Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co. 127 N.M. 729, 734 (1999)).
199
See Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 97 (2016) (“[A] new and independent, or
superseding, cause may ‘intervene[ ] between the original wrong and the final injury such that the
injury is attributed to the new cause rather than the first and more remote cause’ ”) (quoting Dew v.
Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (2006)); Michelle Miley, What Causes Housing
Prices to Rise in the United States?, SFGATE (June 20, 2018), https://homeguides.sfgate.com/
causes-housing-prices-rise-united-states-56413.html.
200
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 459 (2006).
201
Id.
202
See Miley, supra note 200.
203
“‘Hedonic regression’ is a technique that isolates the factors that contribute to the value of
a property by studying thousands of transactions. Hedonic analysis determines the contribution of
each of these factors to the value of a home.” City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112,
197
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loss in property values attributable to foreclosures caused by Wells
Fargo’s predatory loans, isolated from any losses attributable to . . . other
independent causes,” the court would still need to engage in “intricate,
uncertain inquiries” to ascertain damages because the court would need
to address any issues raised regarding Oakland’s regression analysis.204
For instance, Wells Fargo argued that Oakland’s regression analysis
was invalid because it did not account for “well-recognized causes of
foreclosure like job loss, medical hardships, or divorce.”205 The Ninth
Circuit was unpersuaded, and held that the variables were irrelevant because they did not correlate with how likely a person would receive a
predatory loan.206 However, a borrower’s divorce or job loss could arguably sever the causal chain between Oakland’s losses and Wells
Fargo’s unfair lending practices.207 Unlike the foreseeability standard,
where the “existence of intervening factors do not preclude liability” so
long as the injury is foreseeable, proximate cause under the directness
standard requires a direct connection between the asserted harm and alleged violative conduct.208 That means Oakland must prove the “absence
of any intervening forces” rather than that Wells Fargo created a foreseeable risk of harm to Oakland.209 Thus, factors like job loss, divorce, and
medical hardships should be relevant, unless Oakland could establish that
Wells Fargo is liable, notwithstanding an individual’s failure to pay, because any individual who received a predatory loan is doomed to
default.210
1120 n.11 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
204
Anza, 547 U.S. at 46; City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128, 1134 (“Wells Fargo . . . attacks
the City’s foreclosure regression on multiple fronts . . .”); cf. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]ggregation and statistical
modeling are [in]sufficient to get . . . over the hurdle of whether the ‘damages claim is . . . highly
speculative.’ ”) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 549 (1983)).
205
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1134.
206
Id.
207
See DIAMOND, supra note 102, at 184 (“Highly improbable and extraordinary intervening
forces are generally found superseding and preclude liability.”); see also Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494
S.W.3d 90, 97 (2016) (“[A] new and independent, or superseding, cause may ‘intervene[ ] between
the original wrong and the final injury such that the injury is attributed to the new cause rather than
the first and more remote cause’ ”) (quoting Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448,
450 (2006)).
208
DIAMOND, supra note 102, at 187; Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 259
(1992).
209
DIAMOND, supra note 102, at 187; cf. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct.
1296, 1299 (2017).
210
See generally Lauren Thomas, Understanding Confounding Variables, SCRIBBR (Apr. 2,
2021), https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/confounding-variables/ (“In research that investigates
a potential cause-and-effect relationship, a confounding variable is an unmeasured third variable that
influences both the supposed cause and the supposed effect. It’s important to consider potential
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Contrary to being a straightforward process to determine damages,
using a Hedonic regression analysis to prove damages requires a court to
engage in comprehensive inquiries to ascertain damages.211 As the Ninth
Circuit noted, Oakland’s property tax claim would need to be “tested
through discovery, including the rigors of expert rebuttal.”212 For example, Wells Fargo challenged Oakland’s reduced property values, reasoning that California caps property tax increases at two percent.213 The
court would thus have to “evaluate competing evidence to determine if
the two-percent cap undermines Oakland’s regression analyses.”214 Furthermore, Oakland’s Hedonic regression analyses would need to be
“scrutinized during discovery and at trial” to determine if Wells Fargo’s
predatory lending practices proximately caused Oakland’s diminished
tax base.215
These are precisely the type of inquiries that Holmes and Miami I
warned against because they go “beyond the first step.”216 As a general
rule, the less direct an injury, the more difficult it is to ascertain “the
amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct
from other, independent, factors.”217 In Holmes, the Court held that to
award damages to the plaintiff, the district court must first determine if
the plaintiff was injured due to the defendants’ alleged stock manipulation scheme, or due to the broker dealers’ failure to recognize market
developments.218
Similarly, in City of Oakland I, the court must determine if Oakland
collected less tax revenues due to market conditions (e.g. supply and demand), area desirability, the economy or other circumstances, leading to
lower property values.219 Conducting a Hedonic regression analysis
would not overcome the difficulty of determining the amount of damages
that are attributable to Wells Fargo or alleviate the court from needing to
confounding variables and account for them in your research design to ensure your results are
valid.”).
211
See City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128, 1134 (“Wells Fargo . . . attacks the City’s foreclosure regression on multiple fronts . . .”); see generally Thomas, supra note 211 (the court may need
to ensure the internal validity of Oakland’s regression analysis).
212
See City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1135.
213
Id. at 1135-36.
214
Id. at 1136.
215
Id.
216
See Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271 (1992) (quoting Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1299 (2017) (quoting Hemi Grp.,
LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
217
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at
271) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272-73.
219
See Miley, supra note 200.
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engage in comprehensive inquiries to ascertain damages.220 Considering
the complexity in attributing Oakland’s tax revenue loss to Wells Fargo’s
predatory lending practices, the first factor weighs against Oakland’s reduced tax revenue claim.221
2. Factor Two: The Risk of Duplicative Recoveries
On the one hand, individual borrowers cannot recover the same reduced property-tax revenues as Oakland, so there is no risk of doublecounting the damages owed to Oakland versus to individual borrowers.222 On the other hand, there is duplicative recovery because Wells
Fargo could potentially “pay repeatedly” for the same alleged misconduct.223 In City of Oakland I, the Ninth Circuit held that there was “no
risk of duplicative recoveries” because individual borrowers cannot recover Oakland’s reduced property tax revenues.224 Therefore, there was
no need to apportion damages between multiple plaintiffs because the
damages suffered by individual borrowers were entirely independent of
the damages suffered by Oakland.225 However, another way of looking at
this factor is asking whether there is a danger of duplicative litigation
raising identical issues, resulting in multiple recoveries arising from the
same conduct.226
The court in Pruitt, for instance, denied the plaintiffs’ claims for lost
profits, despite the fact that allowing the plaintiffs’ recovery would not
result in double-counting of damages.227 Judge Merhige in Pruitt rea220
See Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 171 F.3d 912,
929 (3d Cir 1999) (rejecting use of statistical modeling to measure damages because it would not
“overcome the difficulty of proving the amount of damages.”); see also Thomas, supra note 211 (if
you fail to account for confounding variables, your results may not reflect the actual relationship
between the variables you are measuring).
221
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes
to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other,
independent, factors.”).
222
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1129 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g
granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th
Cir. 2021).
223
See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also City of
Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1129 (“[T]he Supreme Court has limited lawsuits to directly harmed individuals due to ‘the risk of duplicative recovery engendered by allowing every person along a chain of
distribution to claim damages” from a single violation.”) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready,
457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982)).
224
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1129.
225
Id.
226
See Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 979 (“Considerations both of equity and social utility suggest
that just as defendant should not be able to escape liability for destruction . . . , it should not be
caused to pay repeatedly for the same damage.”).
227
Id.
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soned that allowing indirect victims to recover would cause the defendant to pay repeatedly for the same conduct and open the door to massive
litigation.228 While risking massive litigation was not part of the second
Holmes-factor inquiry, it should be considered together with factor-two
because Miami I, Holmes, and Anza all expressed the concern that allowing indirect victims to sue “would risk ‘massive and complex damages litigation.’”229
For instance, the Anza Court held that there was no risk of duplicative recoveries, but the “attenuated connection” between the plaintiff’s
injuries and the defendant’s conduct “implicate[d] fundamental concerns
expressed in Holmes.”230 In Holmes, the Court raised the concern that
allowing indirect parties to sue would open the door to massive litigation
and burden the courts with complex damages litigation.231 Likewise, allowing Oakland to sue as an indirect victim for tax revenue injuries could
prompt other cities and counties to pursue the same type of suit and open
the door to massive litigation.232 To deter indirect plaintiffs from filing
massive suits and burdening the courts, courts have, in many cases,
“raised an absolute bar to recovery” rather than allow plaintiffs to “risk
failure to prove damages as their injuries become increasingly
remote.”233
However, permitting Oakland to proceed on its demand for injunctive and declaratory relief may weigh in favor of this factor.234 The damages awarded to individual borrowers would not be duplicative and
Wells Fargo would not be paying more than once for the same conduct.235 Wells Fargo would potentially pay individual borrowers once,
228
Id. at 979-80 (“[B]ecause of the large set of potential plaintiffs, even the commentators
most critical of the general rule on indirect damages have acknowledged that some limitations to
liability . . . is advisable.”).
229
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (quoting Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983)); Holmes v. Sec. Inv.
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 259 (1992); see generally Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451,
460 (2006) (“The element of proximate causation recognized in Holmes is meant to prevent these
types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation.”).
230
Anza, 547 U.S. at 459.
231
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 259 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545).
232
See Agnello, supra note 18; cf. Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 979 (“[T]he number of parties with
a potential cause of action against defendant is hardly exhausted in plaintiffs’ complaint. In theory,
parties who bought and sold to and from the plaintiffs named here also suffered losses in business, as
did their employees. In short, the set of potential plaintiffs seems almost infinite.”).
233
Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 980.
234
See Injunctive relief, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/injunctive_relief (last visited Mar. 22, 2021) (“Injunctive relief . . . is a remedy which restrains a party
from doing certain acts or requires a party to act in a certain way.”).
235
See Anna Majestro, Preparing for and Obtaining Preliminary Injunctive Relief, ABA
(June 4, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/practice/2018/preliminary-injuction-relief/ (a request for injunctive relief is typically granted when there
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and be forced to stop its alleged discriminatory lending practices.236
However, granting declaratory or injunctive relief could potentially open
the door to massive suits and burden the courts with ongoing review and
oversight.237 Therefore, the second factor, when considered in conjunction with the risk of massive litigation, weighs against Oakland’s claims.
3. Factor Three: Whether Direct Victims Are Best Suited to
Vindicate the Law
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice succeeded in pursuing the
same claims related to discriminatory subprime lending in the borrowers’
stead and obtained relief for aggrieved borrowers.238 However, individual suits brought by direct victims against Wells Fargo were largely unsuccessful because individual borrowers did not know that they were
discriminated against or that they received a predatory loan until after the
statute of limitations had passed.239 Moreover, individual borrowers
often lack the financial means to bring a suit in federal court.240 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit held that Oakland could better deter Wells Fargo’s discriminatory lending practices because individual borrowers could only challenge the lending policies, whereas Oakland could “remedy the Bank’s
systematic misconduct.”241 However, like individual borrowers, a majority of the suits brought by cities and counties have largely resulted in
dismissal.242
In Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, the city alleged that
Hemi’s failure to report its cigarette sales to the State of New York
caused the city to lose tax revenue.243 However, the Court held that the
is no adequate remedy at law (i.e. difficultly in quantifying damages)); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 525 (“An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act.”).
236
See McGill v. Citibank, 2 Cal.5th 945, 951 (2017) (an injunctive relief prohibits the defendant from engaging in “unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public.”).
237
See Injunctive Relief, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/injunctive_relief (last updated June 2020) (“Injunctive relief is generally only granted in extreme circumstances.” Such orders, if not obeyed, may be punished as contempt. “Due to its coercive force, a
grant of injunctive relief is subject to immediate review by an appellate court.”).
238
See Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Order & Statement of Points and Authorities at 13,
United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (2012) (No: 1:12CV01150), 2012 WL 2849462. See also
Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 9, City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2017 WL
9854955 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017) (No. 3:15-cv-04321-EMC).
239
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g
granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th
Cir. 2021).
240
Id.
241
Id. at 1129-30.
242
Agnello, supra note 18.
243
Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010).
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customers’ failure to pay taxes was the direct cause for the city’s injuries—not Hemi’s failure to report to the State.244 Moreover, the State,
rather than the city, was better situated to sue because it imposed its own
$2.75 taxes on each pack of cigarette sold.245
Likewise, individual borrowers, as immediate victims of Wells
Fargo’s discriminatory lending practices, are still in the best position to
sue and recover damages despite noted challenges.246 To deter Wells
Fargo’s systemic misconduct, perhaps the most effective course of action
is for the Attorney General to commence a civil action on behalf of the
residents.247 This would avoid dismissal for failure to adequately plead
proximate cause.248 Since directly injured victims could sue without the
proximate cause problems that accompany suits brought by plaintiffs
who are remotely injured, the third factor weighs against Oakland.249
B. APPLYING THE DIRECTNESS OF HARM STANDARD TO CITY OF
OAKLAND’S REDUCED PROPERTY TAX REVENUE CLAIM
WOULD PRECLUDE RECOVERY
In Miami I, the Court held that mere foreseeability is not enough to
establish proximate cause in the context of the FHA.250 Instead, the directness standard should be used to establish proximate cause.251 Under
this standard, Oakland must prove a direct connection between Wells
Fargo’s predatory lending practices and its alleged injuries “without too
many intervening causes,”252 rather than show that Wells Fargo created a
foreseeable risk of harm to Oakland.253
In Holmes, the Court held that the link between the plaintiff’s harm
and the defendants’ stock manipulation was too remote to establish proximate cause because the plaintiff’s harm was contingent on the harm the
244

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
246
Cf. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 981 (E.D. Va. 1981) (held that the
“defendant may be held liable to plaintiff commercial fishermen, but not to those businesses which
purchased fishermen’s harvest.”).
247
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(1)(A) (“The Attorney General may commence a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court for appropriate relief with respect to a discriminatory
housing practice referred to the Attorney General by the Secretary under . . . this title.”).
248
See Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 980 (courts have barred recovery rather than risk “failure of
proof as damages become increasingly remote and diffuse . . .”).
249
See id; Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
250
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017).
251
Id.
252
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting);
DIAMOND, supra note 102, at 187.
253
See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (“With respect to the FHA, foreseeability alone
does not ensure the required close connection.”).
245
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broker dealers suffered.254 Likewise, in City of Oakland I, Oakland was
harmed only insofar as Wells Fargo first harmed the individual borrowers.255 The initial FHA violation that led up to Oakland’s injuries required city residents to be injured first.256 After that, the property must
be foreclosed, and the value of the surrounding properties must decrease
due to the foreclosures.257 Due to the indirectness between Oakland’s
asserted harm and Wells Fargo’s alleged violation, many other intervening factors may have well caused Oakland’s injuries.258 Thus, Oakland
as a secondary victim did not satisfy the proximate cause standard
needed to recover its reduced property tax claim.259
C. COMPARING THIS NOTE’S APPLICATION OF THE HOLMES
THREE-FACTOR TEST WITH THE EN BANC COURT
The en banc court clarified that although the Holmes factors were
instructive, they were not mandatory in the directness analysis.260 Applying the Holmes factors to Oakland’s tax revenue claim, the en banc court
found Oakland’s “theory of harm” failed all aspects of the test, except for
the second factor.261 According to the en banc court, Oakland failed the
first factor because Oakland’s “‘theory of liability rests not just on separate actions, but separate actions carried out by separate parties . . . .’”262
The court also asserted that Oakland’s regression analyses fell short because the analyses only showed the discriminatory loans’ likeliness of
foreclosure, rather than a causal connection between Wells Fargo’s predatory loans and Oakland’s decreased property tax revenues.263 Thus,
even if the court accepted the results as true, a court would still be left
with the challenge of “isolating the ‘damages attributable to the viola254

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 259.
See City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated
reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030
(9th Cir. 2021) (the loans issued by Wells Fargo first had to harm minority residents before diminishing Oakland’s property tax revenues).
256
See id. (the “predatory loans issued by Wells Fargo . . . caused injury to individual borrowers, namely in the form of foreclosures, also necessarily injured the City because the foreclosures
caused a respective drop in property values and in turn reduced property-tax revenues.”).
257
See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1311 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
258
Cf. id. (opined that the court of appeals would not have to “look far to discern other,
independent events . . . might well have caused the injuries Miami alleges . . . .”) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259
Cf. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274 (held that “secondary victim[ ] does, and should, run afoul of
proximate-causation standards . . .”).
260
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 14 F.4th 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2021).
261
Id. at 1039-41.
262
Id. at 1040 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010)).
263
Id.
255
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tion, as distinct from other, independent, factors.’”264 This Note similarly
argued that conducting a regression analysis would not alleviate a court
from having to engage in comprehensive inquiries to ascertain damages,
because utilizing a regression analysis to prove damages would raise
complex damages issues that the court has to address.265
As to the second factor, the en banc court held that there was no risk
of needing to adopt complicated rules to apportion damages among
plaintiffs at different levels because individual borrowers cannot recover
Oakland’s property tax revenues.”266 This Note also recognized that individual borrowers cannot recover the same lost property tax revenues as
Oakland.267 However, this Note argued that factor two should weigh
against Oakland’s damages claim as a matter of public policy because
allowing Oakland to sue as an indirect victim for tax revenue injuries
could prompt other cities and counties to pursue the same type of suit
and open the door to massive litigation.268
In terms of the third factor, the court held that individual borrowers
could be counted on to sue and are “incentivized to do so through the
availability of punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and equitable relief.”269
The court also noted that organizations, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development could
sue under the FHA.270 This Note similarly argued that individual borrowers or the Attorney General are in the best position to sue, because they
could sue without the issue of failing to satisfy proximate cause.271 Having applied the Holmes three-factor test, the court held that it reinforced
the court’s view that Oakland did not meet the directness requirement of
the proximate-cause standard.272
CONCLUSION
The prevailing standard of proximate cause under the FHA is a direct causal connection between the asserted claim and alleged miscon264

Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
See City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1124, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2020),
vacated reh’g granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14
F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2021).
266
City of Oakland, 14 F.4th at 1040-41.
267
City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1129.
268
See Agnello, supra note 18; Holmes, 503 U.S. at 259.
269
City of Oakland, 14 F.4th at 1041.
270
Id.
271
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
272
City of Oakland, 14 F.4th at 1040.
265
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duct.273 Oakland’s claim for loss of property tax revenues did not satisfy
proximate cause under the directness standard set out in Miami I because
the link between Oakland’s alleged tax revenue injury and Wells Fargo’s
violative conduct was too attenuated.274 The Supreme Court in Miami I
specifically stated that the injury alleged must have some direct relation
to the alleged misconduct.275 The Court also advised that a damages
claim should not “go beyond the first step” of the causal chain.276 The
first step depends on the “nature of the statutory cause of action” and “an
assessment of what is administratively possible and convenient.”277 To
determine whether an indirect injury is administratively possible and
convenient under a given statute, the Supreme Court in Holmes considered three factors,278 which, when applied to City of Oakland I, weighed
against Oakland’s reduced property tax claim.
As discussed above, Oakland did not meet the first factor, because
the court would have to engage in intricate inquiries to ascertain damages
attributable to Wells Fargo’s misconduct, notwithstanding Oakland’s
claim that its hedonic regression analysis could “precisely calculate the
exact loss in property values attributable to foreclosures caused by Wells
Fargo’s predatory loans . . . .”279 Next, the second Holmes factor failed
as a matter of public policy, because allowing Oakland to proceed when
its tax revenue injuries were insufficiently direct would set a dangerous
precedent, and would open the door to massive suits—an outcome courts
have historically sought to avoid.280 Finally, the third Holmes factor
failed because the direct victims or the Attorney General could be

273

See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006)
(held that when a court evaluates proximate cause, “the central question . . . is whether the alleged
violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”); Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (held that
“proximate cause under the FHA requires ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged.’ ”) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
274
Cf. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1311 (opined that “neither Miami nor any similarly
situated plaintiff can satisfy the rigorous standard for proximate cause . . . .”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275
Id. at 1306.
276
Id. at 1299 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277
Id. (first quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
139 (2014); then quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
279
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1136 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated reh’g
granted en banc, 993 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 14 F.4th 1030 (9th
Cir. 2021). See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006).
280
Summers, supra note 99, at 540-41.
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counted on to sue Wells Fargo for its alleged misconduct without running afoul of the proximate cause standard.281
Echoing Judge Merhige’s conclusion in Pruitt, although Oakland’s
damages were insufficiently direct, it does not mean that Wells Fargo
should not avoid liability.282 It also does not mean that Oakland’s injuries were “in any sense unforeseeable,” or that Wells Fargo’s alleged
discriminatory conduct, if true, should go unpunished.283 However, Oakland is not the proper plaintiff in a cause of action against Wells Fargo
because Oakland’s reduced property tax injuries were too remote to establish proximate cause under the FHA.284 To seek redress for Oakland
residents and to deter Wells Fargo’s future systemic misconduct, the Attorney General, rather than Oakland, is better suited to bring suit against
Wells Fargo.285

281
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(1)(A) (“The Attorney General may commence a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court for appropriate relief with respect to a discriminatory
housing practice referred to the Attorney General by the Secretary under . . . this title.”).
282
See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979 (E.D. Va. 1981) (opined that
“defendant should not be able to escape liability for destruction of publicly owned marine life . . .”).
283
See id. at 980.
284
Cf. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1299 (held that “the link between the alleged FHA
violation and its injuries is exceedingly attenuated.”).
285
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(1)(A).
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